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Abstract 
 
The role of a person’s identity and sense of integration into society as instruments 
of economic development has been vastly underestimated in the literature in economics. 
We talk of policies to subsidize the poor and give direct support to alleviate poverty. But 
in the long run, what is critical is that we instill in people a sense of belonging and having 
certain basic rights as citizens. What the poor and the marginalized in society lack is a 
sense of “participatory equity.” This paper tries to advance this perspective by building a 
new model where a person’s community identity matters, ex post, in determining if he or 
she will be poor, even though (unlike in the Spence model) all persons are identical ex 
ante. 
 
The paper also draws on data collected from an NGO-run school in Calcutta to 
illustrate the role of a school child’s sense of ‘belonging’ in determining how the child 
performs academically. The theory and the empirical work are inputs into the larger, 
more general idea that when people feel marginalized in a society, tend to ‘give up’. A 
substantial part of the paper is devoted to the policy implications of these analytical ideas 
and empirical results in the context of national policies and globalization. 
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1.   Social Integration and Economic Development 
 
The role of a person’s identity and sense of integration into society as instruments 
of economic development has been vastly underestimated in the literature in economics. 
We talk of policies to subsidize the poor and give a variety of direct support to alleviate 
poverty. These are of course important, but, in the long run, much depends on whether 
we can instill in people a sense of belonging and a sense of certain basic rights as 
citizens. I shall argue in this paper that what the poor and the marginalized in society lack 
is a sense of “participatory equity,” namely, the sense that they belong to their society 
and also have rights like others. If this can be instilled in them, then economic 
development can be sustained much more effectively and without the use of permanent 
external crutches. The theme of “participatory equity” and economic development is 
relatively new to economics. This paper will try to advance this perspective by building 
on the growing body of work in politics, sociology and, more recently and 
parsimoniously, economics. The aim will be to draw on this diverse literature, but to 
contribute to broadening the models that economists use to craft policy. 
  It has, for instance, been noted that in some societies development seems to 
bypass large segments of the population. In South Africa, the unemployment rate among 
Blacks is close to 50%, much higher than the unemployment rate of just-over 10% among 
Whites, and the unemployment among Coloreds lies somewhere between these two 
rates
1. In contemporary India, more than 50 years since untouchability was declared 
illegal, there are large sections of ‘backward castes’ that remain distinctly poorer than the 
                                                 
1 The figures are from the Labour Force Survey, 2003, conducted by Statistics South Africa.   4
rest of society. In the United States, if one looks at the life expectancy and morbidity of 
inner-city Blacks, so much worse are the numbers compared to the mainstream that it 
appears as though they belong to another nation,.  
The standard neoclassical model of economics is inadequate to understand these 
phenomena. How can it be that the Blacks in South Africa have such high unemployment 
rates so persistently? Surely a firm that employs Blacks can undercut the wages of other 
firms that employ Whites, earn higher profits and drive the other firms out of business. 
This should, in the long run, cause Black unemployment rates to converge towards White 
and Colored unemployment rates. There are models in economics that can explain the 
persistence of such differences, but I shall argue that the real reasons run deeper than 
what most of our models suggest. Once a group of people is left outside the system or 
treated as marginal over a period of time, forces develop that reinforce its 
marginalization. The group learns not to participate in society and others learn to exclude 
members of this group, and participatory inequity becomes a part of the economic and 
societal ‘equilibrium’.  
  Once this happens, a variety of interesting policy questions arise. How can we 
disrupt such an equilibrium and take the economy towards an outcome where there is 
greater participatory equity? We can of course use taxes and subsidies but other novel 
kinds of policy instruments suggest themselves, once we properly understand why some 
groups are excluded and how poverty is often a consequence of a person’s group identity. 
The odds of breaking out of poverty can be much lower for an Indian Dalit, an American 
Black, and a South African Zulu, even if that person has the same education, intelligence 
and physical strength as another person belonging to a more advantaged group in the   5
same country. It is often thought of as politically and morally correct behavior not to take 
account of a person’s group or community identity. This is certainly as it should be for 
many different kinds of activities, such as when an examiner is evaluating answer scripts 
of different people. But if, as research analysts, we ignore a person’s identity markers, we 
risk missing out on a critical factor, which may explain why a person is so poor and this 
could handicap our effort to design good policy. This is the central theme of the present 
paper.  
  It will also be shown that some of this argument carries over to international 
policy making. In today’s globalized world it is possible for geographical segments of 
the world and whole nationalities and religions to feel left out from the global boom. 
Hence, the idea of participatory equity has a global dimension that is important not to 
miss out on. This has important policy implications. We may have to make effort to 
deliberately draw sections of the world that, left to free market forces, would be left out 
and marginalized, into the global market place, through planned interventions in the 
global economy. This may require some sacrifice of short-run efficiency but it is 
necessary for our long-run well-being and political stability. This relates closely to the 
problem and tensions that are arising because of rapid economic globalization and much 
slower advance in global political institutions that I have written about elsewhere (Basu, 
2005a, 2006a). Since global interventions lie beyond the purview of any single nation, 
this gives rise to special responsibilities on the part of international organizations such as 
the World Bank, the IMF, the ILO, the WTO and the United Nations and raise important 
and difficult questions of global governance (Basu, 2002).   6
  It is worth digressing briefly here to talk about the role of identity, which is a 
relatively new topic in economics (Akerlof and Kranton, 2001, 2003; Loury, 2002), 
though among sociologists and social psychologists its significance has long been 
recognized (see, for instance, Goffman, 1959; Tajfel, 1974). Usually, when we think of 
identity in economics or more broadly the social sciences, we think in terms of conflict 
and competition, the communal clustering of behavior and mutual support (and often 
aggression  towards the other side), and the persistence of certain cultural practices 
(Varshney, 2002, 2005; Basu, 2005b). In the present paper I draw on these new 
perspectives but my aim is to understand why some people remain poor and some do well 
and the role of one’s group identity in these outcomes. We have conducted too much of 
our analysis of poverty, overlooking this issue of identity. Wedded, as so much of 
economics is, to methodological individualism, social identity is a difficult concept to 
accommodate in our thinking. Hence, the convenient presumption was that identity either 
did not matter, or, if it did, it did so only as a surrogate for deeper factors. If we could 
understand those factors, we could do without having to refer to identity. The argument in 
this paper is that this is not possible, at least not for the world as it exists now. Identity 
matters fundamentally. It may be conceivable that in some future world a person’s 
community or other group identity will cease to be important—I certainly hope so—but 
for now that is not the case.  
  The central analytical idea is developed in the next section. In section 3, I pursue 
some of the non-monetary roots of monetary backwardness and how a person’s sense of 
self can influence performance. I report from some recent studies in India and South 
Africa and briefly from some data that I have collected on classroom performance of   7
slum children in Kolkata (formerly Calcutta). Section 4 discusses the policy implications 
of the model and the empirical findings. Section 5 discusses these ideas in the context of 
globalization. Section 6 consists of closing remarks. 
 
2.   Group Identity, Poverty and Market Forces 
 
  We do observe all around us correlations between a person’s performance and his 
or her community identity—the group with which this person is associated—including 
identity markers which seem to be unconnected to the person’s ‘fundamentals’ or innate 
qualities, like IQ or productivity. Men are higher income earners than women; native 
Americans do worse than non-native Americans in terms of economic well-being; 
members of backward Indian castes get lower wages than brahmins; and so on. 
  In traditional economics there is however a tendency to explain people’s earnings 
differentials and other performance differentials in terms of differentials in fundamentals.  
Thus in mainstream neoclassical economics we encounter statements like: “i earns more 
than j because i has greater innate productivity or because j has a stronger preference for 
leisure than i has”.  And such economics is uncomfortable with a theory that concludes: 
“i earns more than j because i is White and j is Black”. 
  For one, if markets led to the latter kind of income disparities, then markets would 
lose some of their neocon lustre.  A free market would no longer be viewed as a fair and 
neutral mechanism for delivering greater income to whoever works harder or is more 
innately productive or is willing to take risks, and so on.   8
  Of course, some may find a mechanism that rewards the innately more productive 
instead of the more needy not so attractive but they reconcile to the fact that, at least in 
the present kind of world, there is no escape from this.  For the economy to do well and 
progress we may need such a reward-mechanism. But what is being claimed here is that 
the market mechanism may not have even this minimal quality of rewarding the more 
productive. Its system of rewards may be much more spurious and vindictive. A free 
market can reward a person of race X or religion Y simply for being of race X or religion 
Y.  In short, identities which may have nothing to do with innate qualities may matter.  
The view, that once markets are properly freed from government intervention, 
racist practices and caste-based rewards will wilt under competitive pressure and 
ultimately wither away, is plain wrong. In the case of caste practices we know that these 
rose to prominence in India at a time when there was very little government and, the logic 
of this note shows that they can flourish very well in the absence of government.  Indeed 
once we try to understand markets, cutting ourselves free from the chord—call it 
umbilical if you wish--of methodological individualism, this is not difficult to see at all. 
  I will present here a simple model to demonstrate this.  It should be clarified that 
it is not as if the literature is devoid of such models.  There are important works by 
George Akerlof, Kenneth Arrow, Michael Spence, Joseph Stiglitz and others which make 
similar points (though not the same). There is a small empirical literature in economics 
which highlight what, at an intuitive level, we all know, that in different markets people 
from certain communities do well and tend to corner a disproportionate amount of the 
market.  Marcel Fafchamps (2000) has described how in East Africa Europeans and 
Indians manage to get loans and credit to start and expand business, whereas Africans are   9
left devoid of funding.  More recently, Abhijit Banerjee and Kaivan Munshi (2004) in 
their study of the garment industry in Tirupur, Tamil Nadu, India, find that one particular 
community, the Gounders--an elite cultivator caste that has had a history of being 
prominent in business and finance--controls a disproportionate amount of capital.  The 
Gounders are a close-knit community and when they go into business they do so with a 
greater abundance of capital than do the non-Gounders, who comprise 42% of the 
exporters of Tirupur in the sample that Banerjee and Munshi study. 
  What these authors manage to demonstrate is that capital in the hands of the non-
Gounders is as productive or even slightly more productive than capital in the hands of 
the Gounders.  Output is smaller in a new non-Gounder firm compared with a new 
Gounder firm but the former typically cross over the Gounder firm in five years time. 
  Why then are the Gounder firms flush with capital?  Banerjee and Munshi 
conclude, rightly, that this suggests the presence of ‘community effects’.  Clearly 
community identity matters per se.  They, however, go on to suggest that this contrasts 
with a model “where the allocation of capital is guided entirely by its marginal product in 
alternative uses”.  I will, however, argue here that community identity effects are entirely 
consistent with capital being guided by the market principle of seeking higher 
productivity.  Except in a tautological sense, a community even without having any 
innate capital cost advantage can corner more capital.  In brief, not only are markets no 
guarantee against community or race-based discrimination, they can actually nurture it. 
  The basic idea is simple. Barring those involved in completely unskilled work, 
human beings go through life exchanging assurances, making promises and signing 
contracts. A person (call him E) starting a business raises start-up capital by implicitly   10
promising to the investor that he will use the money productively and pay it back with 
interest or profit-share at a later date.  The same man may then go to someone to raise 
working capital.  He may get raw material from some supplier and promise her that he 
will sell his final product to her at a cut price.  E will, in the course of time, also try to get 
into contracts with customers.  If this were a lawn maintenance company, homeowners 
may offer him contracts that take the form of a fixed monthly charge with the promise 
that E will maintain the lawn with the best of his ability. 
  Now suppose you are one of the persons offering E a contract (for instance, 
providing him working capital).  Before doing so, you will try to find out how productive 
and efficient E is (to make sure your money is safe and will yield a return). So you may 
look at his educational attainment, size up his penchant for hard work and promptness at 
returning calls, and so on.  But E’s productivity may depend not just on all these 
characteristics of his.  A large part of what E does depends on what others who offer 
contracts to E (the moneylenders, consumers, and so on – I shall refer to all such people 
here as ‘investors’) do.  If consumers do not sign contracts with E, he will not be able to 
pay you back.  If the provider of raw material refuses to sign a raw material supply 
contract, he will not be able to pay you back. 
  Of course, the same is true of the consumer and the raw material supplier.  Before 
signing a contract, each of them will wonder about E’s productivity and efficiency.  In 
each case, this will depend in part on E’s own characteristics but also on how others view 
E, since whether E will be able to serve consumers well or pay back his raw material 
supplier within the stipulated time will depend on whether he has enough working 
capital.   11
  In most developing countries there may not be much occasion for formal contract 
signing but there will be surrogates for this—such as making verbal promises, shaking 
hands over an agreement, and talking in the presence of a villager senior, who can later 
count as witness. But the essence of the problem is the same. How much compliance you 
can expect from a person depends on how successful he or she is getting others to do 
business with him or her. 
  And here lies the nub. Assume that a person’s community or religions or race 
identity has no bearing on his productivity.  So whether a person is a Christian, a 
Brahmin, Black, White, a Jew, a Gounder or Dalit makes no difference to his business or 
work acumen or to his preference for leisure and work. But if a belief forms that a person 
from community C is more productive, then this may turn out to be true ex post.  A 
person’s community identity could begin to matter in determining how effective a life he 
can lead, even though it has no innate significance and it may also involve no special 
behavior or choice on the part of the person involved. 
  This explanation opens the way for important government interventions, like 
affirmative action.  Hence, it is useful to try to understand the argument more closely by 
formalizing it. 
  This is not necessary but for simplicity suppose there are two kinds of people in 
society – entrepreneurs and investors. Investors offer contracts to entrepreneurs.  
Investors can be those with start-up capital to offer, working capital to lend or lawns that 
need mowing and upkeep.  Entrepreneurs are like E in my above story.  In reality, an 
entrepreneur is not just a person running an enterprise but anyone with responsibilities.    12
It can be a manager of a firm who signs contracts and produces some crucial input for a 
firm; a poor farmer who wants to start a poultry business; a peasant who wants to grow 
vegetables on his plot of land and sell the surplus in the village market; or someone 
running a lawn-maintenance company.  In a more realistic model I would treat every 
person as a bit of both—an investor and an entrepreneur, as indeed we all are.  But to 
keep the algebra simple let us go along with this bifurcation. 
 Each  entrepreneur  i, signs contracts (or deals) and produces output.  Each person 
can sign up to n contracts (it is not humanly possible to handle more) and the output, yi, 
he produces depends on his innate productivity, ei , and the number of contracts, m, he 
manages to sign.  Hence, we can write this as follows 
    yi = F(ei, m),      ( 1 )  
where F is a function that, given the values of ei and m, tells us what the output will be. 
Of course, it is being assumed that if ei is larger or m is larger, then output yi will be 
larger. 
  For simplicity, let me assume that a person’s innate productivity depends only on 
his IQ score and this is easy to test.  So ei is a number between zero and one that denotes 
i’s IQ score.  Alternatively, we could think of ei as i’s educational achievement. 
  In reality, a person’s output depends on how many contracts he is able to sign or 
deals he is able to make but in a more complex way than (1) suggests.  Clearly, it is not 
simply the number of deals or contracts that matter but which ones.  If E, in the above 
example, gets lots of working capital but very few home-owners asking for his service his 
production will be different from having lots of home-owners but little working capital.  
But again, for simplicity and also because in the present context it is harmless, I am   13
making the assumption that what matters is simply the number of deals or contracts 
entrepreneur i gets.   
  To make life even easier I will assume that the ‘production function’, (1), takes 
the following special form. 
    yi = (1 + ei) f(m),      ( 2 )  
where f(0) = 0 and m’’ > m’ imply f(m’’) > f(m’). 
  Next, I will make an assumption that I will call ‘the supermodularity assumption’. 
This says that [f(m+1) – f(m)] increases as m increases.  In words, this means that, of two 
identical entrepreneurs, if one has more contracts and an additional contract is offered, 
then the returns to this additional contract will be greater from the entrepreneur who has 
more contracts.  In other words, your lawn will be better maintained by an entrepreneur 
who has more working capital.  And, likewise, your working capital has a higher 
expected return from an entrepreneur who has more lawn maintenance contracts.
2
  I will here take contract cost to be fixed and constant.  Each contract has a cost of 
c.  So, if an investor offers start-up capital, the entrepreneur is supposed to pay the 
investor c.  Treat c as the opportunity cost to the investor.  If he gets less than c it is not 
worthwhile for him to sign a contract with the contractor. In a more elaborate model I 
would allow for the fact that the investor’s return would be higher the greater the profit of 
the entrepreneur (that is, there is some equity income for the investor). But nothing 
essential is lost here by the simplicity and hence I stay with it. 
                                                 
2 I am using the more bombastic term ‘supermodularity’ instead of the (in this context) equally good term 
‘convexity’, to clarify that I could have worked with a more general model where each contract may have a 
different effect on output. Such a model would use a production function, g, as follows: yi = g(ei, x1, … xn), 
where xi is an indicator variable, which takes a value of 1 if the ith contract is signed and 0 is it is not 
signed. The general assumption I want to use says that if, for some i, xi is changed from 0 to 1, the increase 
in output that occurs with this is greater if the value of (x1+ … + xi-1 + xi+1 + …+  xn) is higher, with ei 
being held constant.   14
 If  i signs m contracts his profit,  , i π  is given by 
     mc m f ei i − + = ) ( ) 1 ( π      (3) 
But what the entrepreneur actually gets is not always  i π  because, if  i π  is negative, he 
simply goes bankrupt and earns zero. That is, there is an effective limited liability clause 
underlying these contracts. There is at times a presumption among economists that 
limited liability clauses are special to advanced market economies. But that is simply not 
true. There is enough evidence that when famines cause crop failures landlords and 
moneylenders are expected to forego at least a part of their claims on the peasant. Not 
only is this simply a matter of informal custom but a finding of a cache of old share 
tenancy contracts in South India shows that these limited liability clauses were often 
written into the contracts (Atchi Reddy, 1996). 
Hence, for those offering contracts, this is a risk that has to be kept in mind.  If  i π  
is negative, each of them receives less than c.  If they knew this in advance, of course, 
they would not have signed the contract, that is, got into an agreement with the 
entrepreneur in the first place. 
  This is exactly the problem that each contractor has to solve in taking a decision 
whether or not to invest in entrepreneur i.  In seeing how he may go about this suppose i 
has two visible characteristics ei and zi, where ei is his IQ and zi is his racial or caste 
identity.  Assume zi can be W or B.  Since zi does not appear in (2), it has no effect on a 
person’s ability to produce.  So at first sight it seems that it will not matter at all. 
 Now  define  e
* and e
o as follows. 
   (1 + e
*)f(1) ≡ c.       ( 4 )  
   (1 + e
o)[f(n) – f(n-1)] ≡c      ( 5 )    15
It is easy to see that e
* > e
o.  This follows from the supermodularity assumption and the 
fact that (4) can be written as 
   (1 + e
*)[f(1) – f(0)] = c. 
  The meaning of these two critical values is this.  If someone’s innate productivity 
exceeds e
*, every contractor will want to offer him contracts, no matter how few other 
contracts he is expected to have.  If e < e
o, then no matter how many contracts such a 
person receives, it is not worthwhile for you to offer him a contract. It is easy to verify 
the above claims.  Hence, individuals with e > e
* will get all the capital they need and all 
the customers they need; whereas individuals with e < e
o will get no contracts.  
The interesting case is that of an individual with e such that e
o < e < e
*.  What 
will happen to such an entrepreneur?   Faced with such an entrepreneur a contractor faces a 
decision problem.  This entrepreneur’s enterprise may or may not be productive.  Let us 
suppose that people use race or caste to form conjectures about how productive such an 
entrepreneur will be.  Suppose it is generally believed that for any entrepreneur, i, with 
ei∈(e
o, e
*), he will be able to generate positive profit,  , i π  if and only if xi = W, that is, i 
is White. 
  Interestingly, if everyone believes in this then this will be true.  It is a self-
fulfilling conjecture and it does not depend on anything that the entrepreneur does.  In 
that case White entrepreneurs will run profitable enterprises and Black entrepreneurs will 
fail, if they try. 
  A simple diagram can illustrate the workings of this model.  Choose an  
e ∈ (e
o, e
*).  Fixing ei = e, draw the production function (2) as shown in Figure 1.  Given 
the supermodularity assumption, it is convex.   16
yi 
y = (1+e)f(m) 
cm 
n m m ˆ
Figure 1 
  Superimpose on it the line cm.  By (5), we know at m = n, (1 + e)f(m) > cm (as 
shown) and, by (4), we know (1 + e)f(1) < c (as shown).  Hence, (ignoring the 
discreteness problem) there exists   such that (1 + e)f( ) = c , with 1 <   < n.  
Hence, with such an entrepreneur if you expect more than   contractors to sign deals 
with him, it is worthwhile for you to sign a deal.  And if you expect fewer than   people 
to sign deals, you will not sign a deal. 
m ˆ m ˆ m ˆ m ˆ
m ˆ
m ˆ  17
  It is actually not necessary that people form conjectures on m.  They may simply 
form conjectures on whether a person will create (weakly) positive profits,  0 ≥ π , or 
negative profits  ). 0 ( < π   In the case of an entrepreneur of the kind illustrated in Figure 1, 
if all contractors share the same conjecture, then either all will offer him contracts or no 
one will and the conjecture will be self-fulfilling.  So if race, color or religion is treated as 
focal information by all, then race, color or religion will turn out to have actual 
information, ex post.   
  This model has one similarity with Spence’s (1974) model of job-market 
signaling and Coate and Loury’s (1993) model of affirmative action.  Racial prejudices, 
even when they have no actual basis, get borne out in equilibrium.  But the similarity 
ends there.  In that model, innate productivity varies across people and people use 
schooling to signal their productivity. In my model, entrepreneurs, across races, are not 
only ex ante the same, but they may not even choose different actions. 
  In fact, in the above model it is entirely possible to have all entrepreneurs having 
the same innate ability.  If for instance ei = e, for all i, and e ˆ
o < e < e ˆ
*,  even then, it is 
possible to have an equilibrium where community identity matters and people of one race 
get all the contracts and earn more.  In other words, the market exhibits racism and the 
racism is entirely a product of the free market. 
  Thus far I have treated ei, for every individual i, as an exogenously given variable, 
such as the person’s innate intelligence. It is easy to modify the above model so that ei is 
something that is chosen by the agent. It could be the amount of education or simply the 
amount of effort she is willing to put into her entrepreneurial activity.  Let us here treat it   18
as the latter and assume that ei 0 [0, 1]. Let the cost of each unit of effort be k. Then 
entrepreneur i’s profit is given by: 
i i i ke mc m f e − − + = ) ( ) 1 ( π       ( 6 )  
  Now, unlike in the above model and somewhat akin to the model of Spence 
(1974), the individual also has to make a decision—how much effort to put in. It is easy 
to see from (6) that, if f(m) – k > 0, then it is worthwhile setting effort equal to 1. 
Otherwise she should set ei equal to 0. Let us suppose that, for some m, f(m) – k > 0; and, 
for some m, f(m) – k < 0. Then how the entrepreneur will behave will depend on her 
expectation of m, that is, on her expectation of how much business others will give her. If 
it is commonly known that investors give business to those of a certain race or caste 
group, then the individual i will put in a high effort if and only if she is of that group. In 
other words, the individual’s own behavior will further reinforce the stereotypes of 
society. In other words, the person’s expectation that others will ‘discriminate’ against 
her may make her perform less efficiently.   
  The way to correct the unfairness of the market is determined government action.  
Different kinds of affirmative actions can correct this.  For instance, subsidizing the 
education of disadvantaged groups or providing subsidized capital to such groups can 
help. Of course, in reality failure can be habit forming.  Persistent discrimination can lead 
to habits of tardiness and sloth and it can take time to break out of these habits.  Hence, 
unlike in the model, where a subsidy can cause an instantaneous switch in equilibrium, in 
reality the change can take a long time and may need sustained effort and some financing 
for some length of time. I shall return to some of these policy questions later. 
   19
3. Social Context, Performance and Productivity 
 
  This model links up interestingly to some recent experimental work on identity 
and performance. Through a set of experiments conducted by Hoff and Pandey (2004a) in 
Uttar Pradesh, the authors demonstrated a remarkable result. Low caste children solve 
mazes (an indicator of intelligence and analytical skill) with as much dexterity as upper 
caste children. But if before the same kind of test each child’s caste is publicly 
announced, then the lower caste children begin to perform worse. Clearly, a public 
proclamation of a person’s caste has a withering effect on that person’s psyche.  
  A similar set of experiments recently conducted by Field and Nolen (2005) with 
South African children—Blacks, Whites and Coloreds--finds similar results, especially 
with boys. Of course, race, unlike caste, is visible. So an announcement of race is not as 
revelatory as the announcement of caste. So what Field and Nolen do is to consider 
situations where no mention is made of race and situations where the atmosphere is 
‘charged’ by giving questionnaires on race. The results are just in and still being analyzed 
but among many other findings is the fact that Black boys perform worse when the 
atmosphere is charged. 
  These rather dramatic results—following in the tradition of earlier work in 
psychology, such as by Steele and Aronson (1995) and Ambady, Shih, Kim and Pittinsky 
(2001)—highlight the connection between social context—in particular, the highlighting 
of identity--and performance. But what causes the connection? Is it just the reminder of 
one’s more marginal status in society that weakens one’s zest to perform? Or is it that the 
announcement of race or caste by the examiners and proctors makes the children feel that   20
they will anyway be discriminated against and so the additional effort is not worth it? It 
will be a while before these questions can be fully answered but further studies by Hoff 
and Pandey (2004b) suggest that it is the latter.  
  If so, then this fits in rather nicely with the model in the previous section, 
especially the modification in the end, where the entrepreneur herself also has to decide 
how much effort she will put into her enterprise. We saw there that, if she thought that 
others were aware of her caste or race, then she herself will act in keeping with the 
stereotype about her caste or race. This drives home the point that a person’s productivity 
depends not just on the obvious variables, such as how much he or she has studied or how 
well-off her family is, but on her social situation. This immediately opens up a whole 
new set of policy options for enhancing human capital and productivity. 
  This general point receives reinforcement in some data that I have recently been 
able to get hold of from an NGO-run teaching institute for slum children in Kolkata 
called Anandam. Anandam is a teaching institute that is meant to supplement teaching for 
slum children. Children are taught basic numeracy, logic, English; they are made to be 
aware of world affairs. The idea is to take the poorest children and spark their curiosity 
and intellectual interests. Anandam collects basic information about the children’s 
background.—Their household income; whether their households have radios, bicycles, 
watches; their number of siblings; and of course basic information about each child, such 
as age, sex and mother-tongue. In addition, they also have with them answers from 
questions directly administered to the children, about social conditions in the household, 
such as, if the parents beat each other, if the parents talk to each other and if so how 
much, if the parents talk to the children.   21
  Furthermore, the school had earlier this year given 60 children, of ages from 9 
years to 16 years, take some basic IQ, arithmetic and general knowledge questions. The 
questions they were asked are reproduced in an appendix. The data were not collected 
with special statistical care and was not meant for formal social science enquiry. They 
were for the school’s internal use. But the data can nevertheless be used to  get a sense of 
what is most important as a determinant of a child’s aptitude. It is not possible to 
determine causality; one can merely get the correlations or run some minimal regressions 
and get a sense of which variables go together with which variables and then speculate 
about correlations. These caveats are meant to warn the reader not to over-interpret these 
results.  
What turns out to be most important for a child’s aptitude is not income, or the 
possession of radios, watches and bicycles; but whether the parents talk to each other and 
whether the parents talk to the child. On the latter, one has to be careful about one 
caveat.--This is significant only vis-à-vis a child’s parents, and not guardians. Children 
who live with their guardians seem to derive no benefit from conversation with their 
guardians. The OLS results and the summary statistics are presented in the three tables 
below. One word of clarification here. What each child was actually asked is if s/he lives 
with his/her parents or not. An answer no to this question is being treated by me here as 
though the child lives with guardians. From a cursory knowledge of the slums I suspect 
this will in general be true, though some children being completely on their own cannot 
be ruled out. In the statistical results reported here Dfamily = 1 means that the child lives 
with his/her parents and Dfamily = 0 means s/he lives with guardians.    22
The only reason for reporting on this result, though this will need more 
investigation in the future, is the suggestion the a child’s social conditions matter 
significantly in how he or she performs in school; and, in this case, they seem to matter 
more than the economic conditions of the child’s household. Children, whose parents 
converse among themselves and with the children, clearly make for a more congenial 
living condition for the children; and this translates into significant human capital. 
Another suggestion—and at this stage it is no more than that--is that a person’s 
citizenship status matters. If a person feels a proper ‘citizen of the household’, it bolster’s 
his or her self-confidence and this again results in intelligence and human capital. If the 
parents talk to you, it bolsters your status in the household and that citizenship status aids 
intellectual performance.
3 This is further reinforced by the fact that children who live 
with their parents on average do better in aptitude tests (see Table 2). In fact, on average 
they get 6.76 marks more. Clearly, children have a more secure status at home when they 
reside with their parents. These are somewhat similar to the results a la Hoff and Pandey, 
and Field and Nolen, on children’s performance when they are reminded of their 
marginalized status in society. 
                                                 
3 It remains a bit of a puzzle why this does not happen for children who live with their guardians, 
instead of the parents. It is possible that when asked if their parents talk to each other, since their parents do 
not live with them, they gave erratic answers to the question.   23
 
Table 1. Definition of Variables and Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
Variables Description Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Aptitude_1  Score on the Type I Aptitude Test   58  5.76  2.3  0  10 
Aptitude_2  Score on the Type II Aptitude Test   59  2.98  1.83  0  6 
Aptitude_3  Score on the Type III Aptitude Test   59  7.73  3.33  0  14 
Aptitude 
 
Sum of the scores from all three parts of 
the test 
58 
 
16.41 
 
5.58 
 
6 
 
27 
 
            
Age  Age of a kid  60  10.07  1.78  7  14 
Dfamily  1 if lives with family, 0 otherwise  60  0.47  0.50  0  1 
Dtv  1 if owns a TV, 0 otherwise  60  0.83  0.38  0  1 
Dradio  1 if owns a radio, 0 otherwise  60  0.57  0.5  0  1 
Dbike  1 if owns a bicycle, 0 otherwise  60  0.43  0.5  0  1 
Wealth A  Sum of Dtv, Dradio and Dbike  60  1.83  0.92  0  3 
Wealth B  Kids' self-reported family income  36  2002.78  1303.29  500  7500 
            
FMcnvs  Parents converse with each other (0, 1, 2)  55  1.09  0.4  0  2 
CMcnvs  Child converses with the mother (0, 1, 2)  51  1.45  0.7  0  2 
CFcnvs  Child converses with the father (0, 1, 2)  50  1.2  0.73  0  2 
CPcnvs  Sum of CMcnvs and CFcnvs  50  2.66  1.15  0  4 
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Table 2. OLS Estimates of the Effects of Parental Conversation on Kids' 
Performance in Aptitude Test 
 
Dependent Variable: Aptitude 
   [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
Age -0.023  0.266  0.288  0.304  1.197**  1.084* 
 [0.454]  [0.486]  [0.485]  [0.564] [0.554]  [0.551]
Wealth
a, b -1.824** -1.259 -1.128 0.001  0.001* 0.001* 
 [0.825]  [0.893]  [0.897]  [0.001] [0.001]  [0.001]
FMcnvs 4.620**  4.780** 4.666** 4.437*  3.772*  3.429* 
 [1.861]  [1.835]  [1.830]  [2.276] [1.950]  [1.932]
CPcnvs 0.334  0.597  -0.261  0.091  0.638  -1.002 
 [0.671]  [0.683]  [1.007]  [0.885] [0.773]  [1.417]
Dfamily   2.594  -1.228    6.765*** 1.083 
   [1.712]  [3.725]    [2.094]  [4.628]
CPcnvs*Dfamily   1.505      2.265 
     [1.304]      [1.653]
Constant 14.264**  8.185  10.193 7.082  -8.694 -2.753 
 [5.595]  [6.814]  [7.005]  [6.787] [7.568]  [8.605]
Observations 45  45  45 30  30  30 
R-squared 0.26  0.3  0.32 0.18 0.43 0.47 
Standard errors in brackets         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
a Wealth A is used for columns [1]-[3]. 
b Wealth B is used for columns [4]-[6]. 
 
 
Table 3. OLS Estimates of the Effects of Parental Conversation on Kids' 
Performance in Aptitude Test for Stratified Samples 
 
 Dependent variable: Aptitude 
 Dfamily=1  Dfamily=0 
   [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
Age 0.774  1.017  -0.136  0.453 
 [0.631]  [0.729]  [0.764]  [1.054] 
Wealth
a, b -1.014 -0.001  -1.146  0.002* 
 [1.083]  [0.001]  [1.536]  [0.001] 
FMcnvs 4.050*  4.739*  5.246  1.867 
 [2.047]  [2.342]  [3.531]  [5.427] 
CPcnvs 1.496*  1.2  -0.451  -1.359 
 [0.827]  [0.880]  [1.181]  [1.669] 
Constant 4.151  0.825  14.601  5.599 
 [7.507]  [8.150]  [11.164]  [18.438] 
Observations 22  19  23  11 
R-squared 0.46  0.48 0.17  0.52 
Standard errors in brackets     
* significant at 10% 
a Wealth A is used for columns [1] and [3]. 
b Wealth B is used for columns [2] and [4].   25
4.  Poverty, Identity and Policy 
 
In the above sections, we looked at some specific links between a person’s 
identity and productivity and a person’s sense of belonging and intellectual skills. Both 
these highlight the link between what are traditionally treated as non-economic variables 
and economic well-being. Viewed in this manner, the above theoretical and empirical 
analyses belong to a larger class of ideas, which claim that to understand an individual’s 
economic well-being, it is essential to know about the larger social status of the 
individual—the community to which he belongs, the kin-system of which she is a 
member, the neighborhood where she has been raised and so on. There is now a growing 
literature that recognizes the role of an individual’s social ‘membership’ and institutional 
location as vital factors that explain if he or she will be poor (Durlauf, 2001, 2006; Hoff 
and Sen, 2006; Plotnick and Hoffman, 1999).  
  Much of traditional economics viewed poverty as the fault of the poor or (when it 
tried its hand at greater kindness) as the choice of the poor. What is good about these new 
membership- or identity-based theories is that they eschew this extreme-individualistic 
precept.  And, with this eschewal, a whole host of new policy options open up. But before 
going to that I want to locate the above models in an even larger idea that, as discussed 
briefly in the introduction, has been around for a while in sociology and social 
psychology but is relatively new to economics, namely the recognition of the importance 
of identity.  
  Whether or not one views this as a challenge to the very axiom of methodological 
individualism, on which economics is, allegedly, founded
4, the recognition of identity 
                                                 
4 For a discussion, see Bhargava (1993), Arrow (1994) and Basu (2006c).   26
clearly alters the way we reason in economics. Consider a question in India’s colonial 
history, which at first sight seems puzzling. Why did British investment, which came so 
plentifully to tea, coffee and the railways in India, come in in a trickle into cotton textile, 
steel and iron—industries which were important in Britain but of no direct concern to the 
bureaucrats of the Empire. Amartya Sen (2005) argues very persuasively that if we 
confine ourselves to an individualistic view of the policymaker and the bureaucrat we 
will be hard-pressed to explain this. But, once we recognize that the British bureaucrat 
may have a British identity, which could lead him to defend British industry not because 
he saw some direct economic benefit for himself in that, but simply because he took that 
to be a defence of his own identity, the pattern of investment becomes easier to 
understand. And here Sen (p. 336) quotes Sir John Strachey, a British administrator: “I 
have not ceased to be an Englishman because I have passed the greater part of my life in 
India […]. The interests of Manchester […] are the interests not only of the great and 
intelligent population engaged directly in the trade in cotton but of millions of 
Englishmen.” 
  Likewise, when the freedom movement and dissent against the British empire 
began in India, it was a matter of some puzzlement to the British that the movement was 
being led by the educated and privileged Indians—people were the greatest beneficiaries 
of the Raj. But once again this was a case where identity became larger than direct 
personal interest.  
This recognition of the significance of identity raises numerous research 
questions, which will no doubt keep our hands full for a long time to come. Is identity 
something that enters directly into a person’s sense of well-being, or to put it in the   27
language of economics, should identity be thought of as an argument in a person’s utility 
function? Or is it something that matters instrumentally? Of the many identity markers 
that each of us carry, which ones are socially salient? Is (or to what extent is) identity a 
matter of choice and/or an innate and unalterable attribute of a person? Can identity 
explain economic performance? Can it be a cause of a person’s poverty?  
The two latter questions have already been answered in this paper and in the 
affirmative. The other questions have found partial answers in the literature and will no 
doubt inspire further research in the future. Clearly, identity can enter directly into a 
person’s ‘utility function,’ as Sen seems to suggest above, and as Akerlof and Kranton 
(2000, 2003) explicitly assume. But it is also possible that identity is of negligible (or 
even no) direct concern to individuals but of great significance ex post. This is suggested 
in the works of Varshney (2002, 2005) and also in the model constructed in Basu 
(2005b).  
Varshney argues that sparks that can potentially cause a conflagration occurs in 
all societies and at various times. But often they are of no consequence. But depending on 
certain societal conditions, these sparks can catch fire and then they become matters of 
consequence. He has tried to identify testable conditions under which sparks in Hindu-
Muslim societies do actually become conflagrations. In Basu (2005b) it is argued in a 
similar vein that there are many identity markers, which we human beings wear with no 
great significance. But in some social contexts these markers become sources of conflict 
and we have to contend with what I describe as “the malignancy of identity.”. When this 
happens, it becomes in one’s individual interest to go with one’s own community and to 
pitch oneself against the ‘other’ community, even for individuals who have no sense of   28
innate-community chauvinism. I also argued that this could be used to explain why 
individuals might wish to adhere to their ‘culture’—for instance, the ghetto culture--, 
even when collectively they do worse by that culture. This brings us back to the kind of 
argument that was developed in the paper where individuals are often doomed by their 
societal location. No individual can do anything to break out of it. 
  This kind of analysis suggests many possible policy initiatives and provides 
justification for some standard initiatives. The most important is affirmative action. These 
models stress the importance of affirmative action—but not just any affirmative action 
but ones that are designed in particular ways. A poorly-designed affirmative action plan 
can lead to greater stereotyping of the disadvantaged groups. 
  In designing an affirmative action plan well, we have to first determine which 
groups to target. Suppose poverty in a society coincides with lower intelligence, race, 
gender and age. Which ones should be the target of affirmative action? What the above 
model suggests is that it must be a trait vis-à-vis which, there is an element of the self-
fulfilling prophecy. If everybody takes the person of this trait to be unproductive, then 
she will be unproductive and if everybody takes her to be productive then she will be 
productive. Clearly intelligence will not have this property, because it is likely to have a 
direct positive bearing on productivity. So while there may be a case (and I believe there 
is) to help all poor people, for the purpose of affirmative action, the unintelligent is not 
the right category to focus on.  
Likewise, age we may want to ignore since we know that everybody will typically 
experience all ages. Hence, over a person’s lifetime there will be equity. But race and 
gender have little innate connection with a person’s productivity and they are traits about   29
which a person can do little to alter. Hence, in a society where one racial group or sex 
does badly, there may be a case for bolstering the group’s position by using subsidies or 
direct legal provisions. What is interesting and different about the line taken in this paper 
is that such policies can be justified purely on grounds of efficiency. These interventions 
tend to deflect the economy from a bad equilibrium to a good equilibrium. 
  Policy interventions in models with multiple equilibria have an interesting trait. 
The interventions need not be persistent. After a certain period, the intervention can be 
revoked without having the economy slide back to the earlier, inferior equilibrium. I have 
elsewhere called such an intervention a ‘benign intervention’. An example of this is a 
nation’s child labor laws. Take, for instance, the U.S., where child labor has been banned 
either by state laws or by the nation-wide Fair Labor Standards Act, 1938. When these 
laws were first initiated they had a lot of bite, but it is arguable that now, even if the law 
were to be revoked, children would not go back to work. The economy has simply shifted 
to a better equilibrium. 
  The paper also suggests the importance of education, government activism and 
the building up of role models to stress to people of various religions, caste-groups and 
races that they are equal citizens with prospects as good as anybody else. Since this 
policy does not entail ‘hard acts’ like new laws or new fiscal initiatives, we often play 
down the role of this. But repeat emphasis that all minorities have equal rights and steps 
to integrate disadvantaged groups into the mainstream by deliberately bringing people in 
to various walks of life—politics, business, science and so on—can have a huge impact 
on people’s sense of self-respect and, through that, on their intelligence and productivity.  
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5. Globalization, Identity and Marginalization 
 
 
  Many of these topics that I have discussed thus far in the context of particular 
nations, carry over to inter-country relations, especially in this age of globalization. 
Moreover, in this age of global capital flows, many policies, if implemented in a single 
nation, would cause capital to bleed. This in turn gives rise to the need for coordinated 
policy initiatives across nations—or at least across similarly placed nations. 
  First, let us see how the logic of the model in section 2 carries over to a nation. 
How well a nation does, clearly depends in part on how much foreign direct investment 
and other forms of international contracts the nation receives. Given that the productivity 
of one foreign direct investment (FDI) depends positively on how many other FDIs it 
receives, it is entirely possible to have multiple equilibria vis-à-vis nations. Each may 
receive very little or plenty of FDIs and other kinds of international offers. One reason 
China is a good bet for investment is that so many nations and multinationals think that 
China is a good bet. In the case of India it is virtually possible to see the shift from one 
equilibrium to another. Till the late eighties nations and corporations were wary of India, 
whether it be on matters of trade, FDIs or portfolio investment. This began to change in 
the early nineties and suddenly money and contracts are beginning to flow into the 
country in large amounts. 
  This should alert us to two important policy wisdoms. First, countries that are 
currently poor and doing badly may need a deliberate and planned nudge. Secondly, after 
a phase of nudging many nations will begin to move on auto-pilot with no further 
intervention from industrialized country governments and international agencies will be   31
required, because it will then be in the self-interest of nations and multinational 
corporations to invest in the country. Hence, the fiscal strain of enabling a poor nation to 
escape poverty may not be as big as appears at first sight. What is needed is the effort to 
take the country beyond a threshold. 
  Let me now turn to the subject of inter-country policy coordination. In today’s 
globalized world with volatile capital, it is important for nations at similar levels of 
development to coordinate on certain policies in order not to drive away capital. This is 
true, for instance, in the matter of labor laws and regulation. One nation trying to 
unilaterally uphold its labor standards, by pushing up wages or enforcing strictly laws 
about workplace safety or giving workers greater right to bargain collectively could 
easily have corporations shift their business to other more lax nations. This can give rise 
to the need for coordinated labor market polices across nations (Basu, 2005a). 
  But there is another matter requiring coordination that has gone unnoticed. Often 
when a nation has a lot of poverty or inequality, we blame the nation or its government 
for this. But just as we now recognize (as discussed above) that the blame for a person’s 
poverty does not lie solely with the person but could lie partly with the collectivity to 
which the person belongs, a single nation may not be able to do much about its inequality 
and poverty in today’s globalized world. It is therefore not be surprising at all that within-
country inequality is rising sharply in most developing countries, most notably, China 
(see Kanbur and Zhang, 2005) and India (see Basu, 2004).   
Effecting transfers from the rich to the poor become very different activities in 
closed and open economies. In today’s world the two resources that have become 
footloose are skilled professionals and capital. An attempt to transfer money to the poor   32
from the rich can therefore be met with flight of capital and flight of professional labor. 
And given that most poor countries cannot afford such flights, this puts a natural brake on 
what a single nation can do about its poverty and inequality
5. This is not to deny that just 
running an economy efficiently, having market incentives in place is itself some help in 
curbing poverty by boosting growth. But, beyond this, nothing much can be done by any 
single country. This can explain the rise of intra-country inequality in tandem with 
globalization and also why poor countries have not been able to do more to curb poverty. 
I have argued elsewhere (Basu, 2006a) and will merely reiterate here that this 
calls for the need to have global coordination of policies for curbing poverty and 
inequality.  Institutional arrangements for doing this are notable by their absence. We 
have the WTO to coordinate on trade policies, the ILO to coordinate on labor policies and 
various organizations for coordinating environmental policies but nothing to orchestrate 
global anti-poverty and inequality control policies. This is something that needs 
immediate thought. 
I do not deny that the individual person and the individual nation has huge 
responsibilities for, respectively, the person’s and the nation’s welfares. There is much 
that has been written about policies for doing this right. But this paper points to the fact 
that much also depends on where the person is embedded and the world in which the 
nation is situated. We can reach out to the individual and the single nation more 
effectively if we do not deny that a lot can be done by good interventions, which entail 
governments and international organizations encouraging better coordination across 
persons and nations.   
                                                 
5 This has been formally modeled in Basu (2006a).   33
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire for Aptitude Test 
 
Type I  
 
1.  Name India’s capital.  
2.  Is Pakistan part of India?
6  
3.  Who is the prime minister of India? 
4.  Who is the chief minister in West Bengal? 
5.  What is the name of the highest peak in the world?  
 
Type II 
 
6.  There are 10 students in a classroom.  One person leaves and two people enter the 
room.  How many students are in the classroom now? 
7.  There are 10 students in a classroom.  Each student was asked to bring two 
biscuits. One student forgot and brought three biscuits.  One student did not bring 
any.  How many biscuits are there?  
8.  The teacher gives 15 biscuits to six students and asks them to share.  How many 
does each student get?  
 
Type III 
 
9.   What will be the number in the blank space: 
1,  3,  5,  (   )  
10.  What will be the number in the blank space  
0,  3,  6,  9,  (   ) 
11.  What will be the number in the blank space
7  
1,  0,  12,  0,  123,  0,  (   )  
12.  There are 10 girls in a class.  Two boys went away.  How many girls are left?  
13.  Red, Blue, Sandesh
8, and Green went for a stroll.  Which should not have been a 
 part of the group?  
14.  In a strange village, two together with two becomes five.  There are two biscuits 
and two biscuits.  Also there are two other biscuits and two more.  How many  
biscuits are in this village altogether? 
15.  From a, b and c, below, choose the one which will fit best in the blank space, 
 following the three words:  hand,    head,    ear,    (      ) 
a.  cat 
b.  foot 
c.  books  
                                                 
6 This may seem too obvious a question, but a few students did think the answer is “yes”.  
7 This was the only question for which no child got the right answer, which is (to the extent that IQ 
questions at all have right answers) 1234.   
8 Sandesh, as all Calcuttans know and for the love of which they are willing to court diabetes, is a delicious 
milk-based sweetmeat.  